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2A B S T R A C T
3This article analyses the South African case of Ochberg v CIR, which dealt 
with the question whether shares issued by a company to Ochberg, who 
was, for all intents and purposes, the sole shareholder, in consideration 
for services rendered and an asset provided to the company, constituted 
“income” in terms of the defi nition of “gross income” in section 7(1) 
of the Income Tax Act No. 40 of 1925 (as it then applied). Ochberg’s 
contention was that he had received no benefi t from the additional 
shares issued as the value of all the shares issued had been the same 
both before and after the issue of the shares. Accordingly, there had 
been no increase in his wealth and thus no income had been received. 
The majority decision (two of the fi ve judges dissenting) of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court held that the shares were “income” 
and had to be valued at their nominal value. The article fi rst provides a 
glimpse into the life of Isaac Ochberg, who was a substantial benefactor 
to charitable causes. It then presents a thematic analysis of the four 
separate judgments set down in the case, and fi nally, discusses certain 
tax principles arising from the judgments. In conclusion, the article 
considers to what extent Ochberg benefi ted from the transaction in 
terms of the Haig-Simons model of taxation and the economic reality 
of the transaction. The lasting value of the decision is demonstrated 
with reference to citations of Ochberg v CIR in a number of more recent 
landmark cases.
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“[T]he presence or absence of a benefi t to the taxpayer from 
something that passes into his possession does not provide a proper 
test in applying the defi nition of ’gross income’.”1
1Apart from the present case, Ochberg v CIR,2 to be discussed in this article, Isaac 
Ochberg was also involved in a case before the Cape Provincial Division two years 
later (December 1932) that dealt with the valuation of accruals and a scheme of 
profitmaking.3 He appeared once more in court, albeit posthumously, when his 
executors attempted to exclude his wife from his estate on the basis that he had not 
been married in community of property.4 The CIR, ironically, joined forces with 
the executors in the court action agreeing with the executors’ contention that the 
Ochbergs had not been married in community of property. This court action was 
lost by the executors of Ochberg’s case which meant that the CIR also lost their 
case. However, it was the case of Ochberg v CIR (discussed in this article) that was 
to make tax history.
2The period relevant to the court case – the 1926/27 year of assessment – and the 
year the decision was made known (April 1931), spans an era of economic crisis that 
is still referred to as The Great Depression, that purportedly started with the 1929 
stock market crash in New York. However, uncertainty about this historic event is 
evident from the following extract from a poem by William T. White:
... What made Humpty Dumpty fall?
Nobody knows for certain at all;
Some say the cause was the stock market crash,
And the call which the brokers sent out for more cash,
While others say Humpty had started to fall,
Before the crash and before the call,
But nobody knows for certain at all.5
1 Roos, J.A., in Ochberg v CIR, 5 SATC 93 at 107.
2 5 SATC 93.
3 Ochberg v CIR, 6 SATC 1.
4 Ochberg v Estate Ochberg and CIR, 11 SATC 294.
5 Anon. 2009. News from 1930.
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3The focus of this article is on the judgment in Ochberg v CIR6 (referred to hereafter 
as “the Ochberg case”). The Commissioner for Inland Revenue taxed Ochberg on 
shares issued to him by a private company (in which he already owned almost 100% 
of the shares). Ochberg’s argument, in essence, was that no benefit could accrue to 
him as he already owned almost all the shares in the company. The objective of this 
article is to discuss the relevance of various arguments raised in relation to whether or 
not Ochberg “benefited” from the transaction and in doing so, the following matters 
will be dealt with:
• an analysis will be presented of the judgments set down in the case, in terms of 
the following themes:
 – whether Ochberg benefited from the issue of the additional shares;
 – the applicability of the decision in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Collins,7 
which was relied on by Ochberg;
 – the substance of the transaction, as opposed to its form;
 – the separate legal personae of the company and Ochberg;
 – the nature of the consideration received in the form of shares; and
 – the interpretative approach followed by the judges.
• pertinent issues and tax principles flowing from the judgments will be discussed:
 – the concept of beneficial receipt;
 – the subjective versus objective debate;
 – the economic reality of the transaction; and
 – the equity of the judgment against Ochberg.
1The contribution made by the present article, in addition to the thematic analysis of 
the judgment (which is a unique method not usually applied to analyse tax cases) 
and the inclusion of a brief portrait of the protagonist in the case, is the exploration 
of the relevance of the Ochberg decision in relation to accepted principles of a good 
tax system and subsequent and similar case decisions.
Ochberg: The man and his times
1Isaac Ochberg, the eldest son of Aaron and Sarah Ochberg, was born on 31 May 
1878 in Uman, a small town in the Ukraine.8 In 1894, at the age of 17,9 he followed 
6 5 SATC 93.
7 1923, A.D. 347.
8 Oranje Orphanage. Isaac Ochberg. At http://ochbergstory.com/the-ochberg-story.html (accessed 22 August 2013).
9 Ochberg v Estate Ochberg and Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 11 SATC 294.
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his father to South Africa and settled in Cape Town. A number of years later he 
established himself as one of Cape Town’s leading entrepreneurs with major 
shipping and property interests and was described as the “plucky ship-owner”.10 
In addition to his business interests, he was also actively involved in community 
affairs and a number of charitable organisations. Ochberg never refused to support 
a worthy cause. His creed was that, since he had achieved success in the business 
world, he had a moral obligation to help those less fortunate.11
2In the aftermath of the First World War, with famine raging in Russia and 
Eastern Europe, Ochberg devised a plan to bring homeless Jewish children from 
these war-ravaged countries to South Africa. A South African Relief Fund for Jewish 
War Victims was established and Ochberg was instrumental in raising £15 000 for 
this purpose. He also convinced the then Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, to contribute 
on a pound-for-pound basis. He personally travelled to Russia and Eastern Europe 
and returned to Cape Town more than six months later with 167 orphans. One of the 
orphans remembered him as follows:
“... he was like a father to us. There was no difference from one child to another, every child 
was a darling, everyone was lovely …”.12
1Ochberg died in 1937 while on an ocean voyage and was buried in Cape Town. 
Almost 80 years later, Isaac Ochberg is still remembered in South Africa and abroad. 
A monument in his honour as a great humanitarian was erected in Israel and a 
documentary film, entitled Ochberg’s Orphans: a film by Jon Blair, was released 
in 2008 to commemorate his heroic deeds. Isaac Ochberg, however, will not be 
remembered for his humanitarian work alone. He took on the tax authorities on 
more than one occasion, but failed at each attempt, even posthumously.
2The background to and facts of the case13 will be set out, followed by a discussion 
and critical analysis of the judgment.
Background to and facts of the case
1Ochberg initially appealed to the Income Tax Special Court against the inclusion in 
taxable income and the assessment to normal and super tax by the Commissioner14 
10 Boiskin, J. 1994. The Ochberg Orphans – An Episode in the History of the Cape Jewish Orphanage. Jewish Affairs. Volume 
49 (2):21-27.
11 Sandler, S. 2012. The Ochberg Orphans. The Jewish Genealogical Society of Great Britain. Volume 20 (2):7–8.
12 Slier, L. 2012. Remembering Isaac Ochberg, Father of Orphans.
13 5 SATC 93.
14 Ochberg v President and Members of the Income Tax Special Court, 4 SATC 227, 1930 at 228.
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in respect of three issues. Only the first issue is relevant to the present article, namely 
shares issued to him in the Airton Timber Company Ltd in return for the cession to 
the company of a lease with the South African Railways and for financial services to 
be provided to the company.
2The appeal to the Special Court was dismissed and the court found that the three 
items had all been correctly assessed by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue.
3Ochberg, dissatisfied with the decision as being erroneous in law, appealed the 
decision to the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. In respect of the 
issue relevant to the present article, the question was whether the issue of the shares 
constituted income. The Cape Provincial Division referred the matter back to the 
Special Court for further information.15 The Appellate Division focused only on 
questions of law arising from the facts as set out in the judgment of the Special Court.
4Airton Timber Company had a nominal (authorised) share capital of £10 000 
made up of 9 950 shares of £1 each and 1 000 1s shares. Prior to the transaction in 
question, Ochberg had held all but six of the 5 107 issued shares, the other six being 
held by “subordinates” and family members. During the year of assessment, Ochberg 
had entered into a contract with the company and the Memorandum of Agreement 
had been lodged with the Registrar of Deeds as required by the then Companies 
Act16 to provide, in exchange for the remainder of the unissued shares (4 843 fully 
paid up £1 shares and 1 000 1s shares), the following to the company:
(i) the cession of a lease held by him with the South African Railways for land 
suitable for a siding and a receiving site for timber;
(ii) financial assistance to be rendered to the company in connection with certain 
shipments of timber; and
(iii) the appellant’s goodwill relating to the continued pledge of his credit on behalf 
of the company.17
1The Commissioner assessed Ochberg on an amount of £4 893, being the face value 
of the shares (£4 843 in respect of the £1 shares and £50 in respect of the 1 000 1s 
shares). Ochberg contested the assessment on the grounds that the shares did not 
constitute income in terms of the Income Tax Act.18 Even though the value of the 
shares (£4 893) might appear to be insignificant in today’s terms, a two-week first-
15 5 SATC 93 at 95.
16 Section 92 of Act 2 of 1892 (Cape).
17 5 SATC 93 at 94.
18 40 of 1925
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class trip on board a Union Castle ocean liner from Cape Town to England19 at that 
time cost £90 and a Studebaker motor car20 £375.
2The Special Court held that, as the company and the appellant were separate 
personae, the agreement was a real and substantial contract between the two parties 
in terms of which the appellant received the shares partly as consideration for the 
right of occupation of leased premises21 and partly for rendering financial services 
(part of his business as a financier).
3In his judgment, Roos, J.A. confirmed22 that the contentions of the appellant 
before the Special Court were as follows:
• the shares had been received as a gift to himself from the one-man company 
controlled by the appellant;
• alternatively: if he had received them for value they did not constitute income;
1and the recorded judgment of the Special Court indicated that the contention before 
that court was that there was no substance to the agreement and the transaction 
evidenced by this agreement was a fictitious one.
2In the Appellate Division, Ochberg based his argument on the following:
• before the transaction he had held all but six of the shares and that he had been in 
full control of the company;
• the further issue of shares had given him no benefit that he did not already have 
and that, at most, the six £1 shares held by the other shareholders would shrink to 
about half of their value in proportion to his increased holding and to this extent 
he had only benefited by £3.
1Each of these arguments was addressed by one or more of the Appellate Division 
judges, and will be discussed below.
2“Gross income”, as it was defined at the time of the transaction, was set out in 
section 7(1) of the Income Tax Act,23 and included in a taxpayer’s gross income:
“the total amount whether in cash or otherwise received by or accrued to or in favour of any 
person, other than receipts or accruals of a capital nature …”.
19 Huisgenoot. 3 April 1931 Deel XV No 470, page 12.
20 Huisgenoot. 10 April 1931 Deel XV No 471, page 38.
21 “Income” under section 7(1)(d) of the Act.
22 5 SATC 93 at 106.
23 40 of 1925.
31 
Ochberg v CIR: No “benefi t” to the benefactor
The judgments
1The decision of the court, to the extent relevant to this article, was set out as follows:24
“Held, … by a majority (Wessels and Stratford, J.A. dissenting) that the value of the shares 
received by appellant from the Airton Timber Co., Ltd., was on the facts as disclosed by the 
statement of the Special Court, income in the hands of the appellant.
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Collins (1923, A.D. 347), distinguished.
1The following facts were not disputed by the appellant:25
• that the shares were received;
• the value attributed to the shares (the par value);
• that the shares were for services rendered and as remuneration for the use or 
occupation of premises; and
• if the shares had been received by any other person, the receipt would be income 
and not a receipt or accrual of a capital nature.
1De Villiers, C.J. in his judgment concluded26 that “[t]hey [the shares] would clearly 
fall under income unless for some valid reason they can be said to be receipts or 
accruals of a capital nature”, and that this appeared to conclude the matter.
2Four sets of grounds for the judgment were prepared and reported: the judgment of 
De Villiers, C.J., Roos, J.A. (Curlewis J.A. concurring) and the dissenting judgments 
of Wessels, J.A. and Stratford, J.A. Each of the reported judgments differed in 
certain important respects and each dealt with all or certain of the issues raised by 
the appellant. An analysis of the judgments revealed the following pertinent issues 
addressed by the judges: the benefit received; the reliance placed by Ochberg on the 
decision of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Collins;27 the substance of the contract 
and its alleged fictitious nature; the separate legal persona of the company; the nature 
of the shares received as consideration for the services provided to the company; and 
the question of the intention of the legislature. These issues provided the framework 
for the thematic analysis of the judgments, comparing and contrasting the views of 
the judges on each issue.
24 5 SATC 93 at 97.
25 5 SATC 93, as reported at 98 and 105.
26 Supra at 98.
27 1923, A.D. 347.
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The benefi t received
1De Villiers C.J. questioned28 why, if there was no benefit, Ochberg had entered into 
the contract and had given valuable consideration for the shares. With regard to 
the argument that he (Ochberg) had formerly held almost 100% of the issued share 
capital of £5 000 and after the issue of the additional shares still held almost 100% 
of the shares (and therefore obtained no benefit), De Villiers, C.J. countered that 
argument by saying that Ochberg could have disposed of the additional shares in 
the open market. Furthermore, “the company was presumably enriched to the value 
of £5 000 by the services rendered and the lease and upon liquidation the assets to be 
divided would have been less by £5 000”, had the agreement not been entered into. 
He concluded29 that “[t]he court need not therefore enquire whether he actually 
was benefited … of that he is the best judge” and30 “[w]hat repercussions the receipt 
of that income may have on the rest of his property does not matter”.
2In relation to whether or not Ochberg had benefited from the transaction, Roos, 
J.A., in his assenting judgment, stated31 that this was not the test, thus echoing the 
conclusion of De Villiers, C.J. Roos, J.A. continued to argue that if that was the test, 
it was in any case clear that he had benefited because the company no longer had the 
power to assign the shares to a person other than Ochberg. Roos, J.A. also responded 
to the appellant’s argument that if he had benefited at all it would have been to the 
extent of £3, being the dilution in value of the shares of the other shareholders. He 
questioned32 at what point the appellant would have become liable to tax where he 
had held most but not all of the issued shares prior to the agreement – if the other 
shareholders held £100 or £1 000? – and, if so, what the benefit would have amounted 
to. He concluded that if benefit is an element, then the moment it is shown that there 
is a benefit, Ochberg would be liable to income tax on the undisputed value of the 
shares.
3Roos, J.A also concluded33 that the deductions provided for in the Income Tax Act 
do not affect the case and “if the transaction stands alone, it is impossible to urge that 
it does not fall under the Act.”
28 5 SATC 93 at 99.
29 5 SATC 93 at 99.
30 Supra at 100.
31 Supra at l07.
32 Supra.
33 Supra at 106.
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4Stratford, J.A., in his dissenting judgment, concluded:34 “I can find nothing in 
the Act which compels us to designate as income something which every principle of 
reason and common sense tells us is nothing of the kind.”
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Collins
1Reliance was placed by Ochberg on the decision in Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
v Collins35 (referred to hereafter as “the Collins case”), where profits were capitalised 
and bonus shares issued to existing shareholders strictly pro rata their existing 
shareholding and by virtue of that shareholding (emphasis added). The decision in 
that case36 was that “the shares so distributed were ‘receipts or accruals of a capital 
nature’ in terms of Section 6 of Act 41 of 1917 and were not assessable for supertax 
...”. De Villiers, C.J. considered37 that there was a “vast difference” between the 
Collins case and Ochberg’s transaction; whereas in that earlier case, profits had been 
capitalised and bonus shares issued to each individual shareholder in proportion to 
his existing holding, in the present case “the shares were issued for services rendered, 
just as they would have been issued to any outsider”.
2Roos, J.A. argued,38 firstly, that after the issue of the shares to Ochberg, the 
Airton Timber Company no longer had the power to issue the shares (to other 
persons) and therefore the issue of the additional shares to Ochberg had value; that 
differentiated the present case from the Collins case. Secondly, in the Collins case, if 
the company had first distributed a dividend and then entered into agreements with 
the shareholders to take up the shares, the dividends would have been subject to tax. 
Presumably his argument was that because Ochberg had given value for the shares 
issued to him and they were not simply a bonus issue out of accumulated profits, the 
shares constituted income. Thirdly, the interest of a shareholder in the company is 
capital, but in the Collins case there was a consequent dilution in the value of each 
share, the logical conclusion therefore being that the shareholders had not benefited. 
Finally, the capitalised profit out of which the bonus issue had been made remained 
the property of the company, subject to the business risks that might wipe out the 
whole investment; Roos, J.A. therefore appeared to reason that the shareholders had 
consequently not benefited from the bonus issue.
34 Supra at 119.
35 1923, A.D. 347.
36 5 SATC 93 at 108.
37 Supra at 100.
38 Supra at 107–108.
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3Stratford, J.A’s opposing view39 was that the decision in the Collins was “directly in 
point ... if the issue is made strictly proportionate to existing shareholdings” (which 
essentially the issue of shares to Ochberg was). He confirmed that the bonus shares 
in the Collins case had been issued in proportion to the existing shareholding and “it 
was by regard to the position of each shareholder before and after the issue ... that the 
conclusion was reached in England, America and in this Court that such shareholder 
did not receive any income”. Ochberg had raised this contention in relation to his 
position before and after the issue to him of the shares, and clearly Stratford, J.A. 
agreed with his argument.
The substance of the transaction
1The contention was made by Ochberg (as stated in the Special Court decision) 
that there was no substance to the agreement and the transaction evidenced by the 
agreement was a fictitious one. De Villiers, C.J. referred40 to the Collins case, where 
the question turned on whether a dividend had been declared or whether profits 
had been capitalised. He concluded that the consideration of the substance of the 
transaction in that case was relevant. He agreed41
“that the court may look at the substance of a transaction, but this argument must be employed 
with judgment, more especially in company law [where] the law endows a company with ficti-
tious personality and [it] remains a juristic person separate and distinct from the person who 
may own all the shares ... To say that a company sustains a separate persona and yet in the same 
breath argue that in substance the person holding all the shares is the company is an attempt to 
have it both ways.” 
1Regarding the alleged fictitious nature of the contract, Roos, J.A. responded42 that it 
seemed to him “impossible to hold that a contract of this nature solemnly registered 
under s 97 of Act 25 can be regarded as fictitious ... Full effect must be given to it ...”. 
With reference to the decision in the Collins case, he also stated43 that “having regard 
to the very truth of the matter and not the form”, the shareholders in that case had 
received “nothing that answers the definition of income”.
2Stratford, J.A., however, stated44 that the choice lies between regarding the issue 
apart from the position of the recipient of the shares and the material worth to him 
39 5 SATC 93 at 116.
40 Supra at 101.
41 Supra.
42 Supra at 106.
43 Supra at 108.
44 Supra at 119.
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and looking at the real nature of the issue and its value to him. Wessels, J.A. agreed45 
with Stratford, J.A’s reasoning and conclusion, and stated46 that “we must not look at 
the form of the transaction but at its real nature”. He continued47 to reason that “[i]t 
was never the intention of the legislature to take away from a person part of his estate 
because he is fictitiously supposed to have received a sum of money. Fictitious income 
is not gross income.”
The separate legal persona of a company
1Ochberg’s contention before the Special Court was that the shares had been received 
from a one-man company that he controlled. The essence of this argument was that 
he and the company were to be regarded as one, and for that reason, he had received 
no benefit from the issue of the additional shares.
2Roos, J.A. refers48 to the contention that it is necessary to consider the relationship 
between the appellant and the company, and if the relationship is considered, the 
appellant “in truth obtains nothing under the contract”. He reasoned49 that “[i]t may 
be that it was a foolish agreement to enter into ... but that does not alter the fact 
of the transaction”. He compares the position of a person other than the appellant 
entering into the same agreement and concludes by posing the question: “How can 
the appellant merely because he stands in a special position towards the company” 
avoid liability for tax?
3Stratford, J.A., however, states50 that “[i]f we are compelled in law to shut our 
eyes to the real substance of the transaction and regard only the receipt of the 
shares divorced from the position of the recipient in relation to the company, then 
the solution, although harshly unjust, is simple and adverse to the appellant”. His 
dissension from the majority decision clearly indicates that he does not consider only 
the form of the transaction but also takes into account the relationship between the 
appellant and the company, by51 “looking at the real nature of the issue”.
4Wessels, J.A.52 enters into a discussion about share transactions (“juggling with 
shares in a private company”) entered into in order to “evade the income tax laws”. He 
agrees that courts should insist on the principle that the individual who controls the 
45 Supra at 111.
46 Supra at 112.
47 5 SATC 93 at 113.
48 Supra at 107.
49 Supra.
50 Supra at 115.
51 5 SATC 93 at 119.
52 Supra at 111.
K. Coetzee, P. van der Zwan, D. Schutte, H. van Dyk & E.M. Stack
36
company should not be regarded as the company, but that it should not be assumed 
in the present case that “juggling with shares has taken place”. He concludes53 that 
“it would be incorrect to say that Ochberg is the company, but nothing can alter the 
fact that the assets of the company are all his and the shares held by him merely show 
how much of the assets would, upon liquidation, form part of his estate”.
The nature of the shares received as consideration
1De Villiers, C.J. succinctly summarised54 the question whether the shares had been 
received as capital: “I am at a loss to understand how what is income if received 
by A for services rendered can be said to have changed its nature into capital 
when received by B, equally for services rendered.” He continued,55 stating that 
it is irrelevant whether and to what extent a person has benefited and this cannot 
convert what is income into capital – which is the only ground on which to exclude 
a receipt from gross income. In relation to the claim that as a result of the issue of 
the additional shares the value of the existing shares decreased, he concluded56 that 
“[w]hat repercussions the receipt of that income may have on the rest of his property 
does not matter”. In response to the contention that Ochberg may have benefited to 
the extent of £3, he also stated57 that “[i]t cannot be contended that £3 of the receipt 
was income and £4 890 was of a capital nature ... [this is] foredoomed to failure”.
2Stratford, J.A., however, concluded58 that “[t]he accrual is of a capital nature since 
it is only obtained by a corresponding diminution of capital previously possessed”. 
Wessels, J.A. argued59 that if it is assumed that the taxpayer possesses nothing other 
than his interest in the company, he will have to realise capital in order to pay the 
tax on the value of the shares issued to him. He therefore denies that the shares are 
income in nature.
The intention of the legislature
1Over the decades, courts have applied many different approaches of interpreting 
statutory provisions. The point of departure is usually the “strict and literal” 
approach of which the underlying assumption60 is that the written statutory language 
53 Supra at 113.
54 Supra at 98.
55 Supra.
56 Supra at 100.
57 Supra.
58 5 SATC 93 at 119.
59 Supra at 113.
60 Du Plessis, L. 2002. Re-interpretation of Statutes at 93.
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is a reliable expression of the legislative intent. According to this approach,61 “the 
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to. This approach 
does not take into account justice, equity or fairness as it follows the letter of the law 
strictly”,62 looking “at what is clearly said. There is no room for intendment. There 
is no equity about tax.”63 In this regard Wessels, J.A. initially states64 that “the court 
is not concerned with the fairness or unfairness of the impost”. Furthermore, De 
Villiers, C.J., in relation to whether or not the fact that a person has benefited, can 
change the nature of a receipt into capital, concluded as follows:65 “That may be a 
reason for the legislature to alter the law but cannot affect our decision [a]s long as 
the law is what it is …”. This seems to indicate that De Villiers adopted a strict and 
literal interpretation of the Act in drawing his conclusion.
2At the time of the judgment, however, South Africa was a “parliamentary state in 
which Parliament reigned supreme”.66 Subsequent to the advent of the Constitution,67 
the judiciary had virtually been compelled to follow a purposive approach to the 
interpretation of statutes whereby the purpose underlying the statute is sought.68 This 
means that the judiciary do not merely seek the “intention of Parliament”, but also 
consider the history of the provision, its broad objectives, the constitutional values 
underlying it and its interrelationship with other provisions. Goldswain submits that 
possibly the majority decision in the Ochberg case would have been different had the 
purposive approach been used. He contends that the minority decisions are more in 
line with the “purposive” approach.
3In his minority decision, Wessels, J.A. states the following: “I cannot conceive 
that the legislature ever intended that the State should take away a portion of a man’s 
capital ... when the sum total of his assets after the so-called receipt is exactly the 
same as before” and a taxpayer being obliged to realise his capital in order to pay his 
income tax “... seems to me to be contrary to the whole tenor of the Act”. This view 
was based on the preamble to the Income Tax Act read together with the definition 
of ”gross income” that the objective of the statue was to tax only income and not 
61 Lord Wensleydale in Pearson Grey vs Pearson, [1856] 6 HL Cas 61 All ER.
62 Goldswain, G.K. 2008. The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation–the Winds of Change. 
16(2) Meditari at 119.
63 Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC 1921 (1) KB 64 at 71.
64 Du Plessis, L. 2002. Re-interpretation of Statutes at 112.
65 5 SATC 93 at 99.
66 Croome, B.J. 2010. Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa at 4.
67 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
68 Goldswain, G.K. 2012. Hanged by a Comma, Groping in the Dark and Holy Cows – Fingerprinting the Judicial Aids 
used in the Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes. 16(3)Southern African Business Review at 31.
K. Coetzee, P. van der Zwan, D. Schutte, H. van Dyk & E.M. Stack
38
capital. These remarks of Wessels, J.A., it is submitted, are indicative of a purposive 
approach to the interpretation of statutes.
4The preamble to a statute, after all, gives an idea of the main object or “purpose” 
of a statute. In Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael’s Executor,69 it was 
stated: “A preamble has been described by an old English Judge as ‘a key to open the 
minds of the makers of the Act and the mischief which they intended to redress’.” 
The court also held that “where the Court is satisfied that the Legislature must have 
intended to limit in some way the wide language used, then it is proper to have 
recourse to the preamble”.
Summary of the grounds for the majority decision
1Roos J.A., in concluding70 that the Collins case did not govern the Ochberg case and 
could not be extended to cover its facts, provided a summary of the reasons for 
his conclusion, which is also a useful summary of the grounds for the majority 
decision. He argued71 that the shares are an amount “in cash or otherwise”, they are 
given for services rendered and the cession of a lease, they have value (and Ochberg 
himself recorded a value for the shares in his books), the contract between Ochberg 
and the company is a valid one, they were not received as capital but as ordinary 
remuneration for services provided and the cession of the lease, and finally, that if 
Ochberg could prove that a special relationship existed between himself and the 
company and therefore that when he received the asset his prior shareholding was 
reduced to 50 percent of its value, he could not, in any event, set off the shrinkage in 
the capital value of his shares against his taxable income.
An analysis of issues pertinent to the judgments
1A number of pertinent issues are revealed by the judgments: the concept of benefit 
as a tax determinant; the objective versus subjective debate; the economic reality 
of the transaction; and the equity of the judgment against Ochberg, in the light 
of the Haig-Simons model of taxation;72 and the precepts of a good tax system, 
69 1917 AD 593 at 597.
70 5 SATC 93 at 109.
71 Supra.
72 Robert M. Haig, 1921 The Concept of Income–Economic and Legal Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax 1 (Robert M. 
Haig ed.), reprinted in Am. Ec. Ass’n, Readings in the Economics of Taxation 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup 
eds., 1959); Henry C. Simons, 1938. Personal Income Taxation 50.
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as postulated by Adam Smith73 in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (1776).
The concept of benefi t as a tax determinant
1In his appeal, Ochberg relied on the fact that he had not derived any benefit from 
the transaction and the concept of “benefit” was referred to in all four judgments 
in the Ochberg case. De Villiers, C.J. remarked74 that the court “need not ... enquire 
whether he actually was benefited ... of that he is the best judge.” In a later case, CIR 
v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd,75 Schreiner, J.A. concluded76 that “the presence or absence 
of a benefit to the taxpayer of something that passes into his possession does not 
provide a proper test in applying the definition of ‘gross income’ ”.
2Regarding the words “received by or accrued to or in favour of” in the definition 
of “gross income”77, Williams states78 that “an amount is not ‘received by’ a taxpayer, 
nor does an amount ‘accrue’ to him unless it is received by the taxpayer on his own 
behalf and for his own benefit” (emphasis added). The cases he refers to in his 
analysis of the phrase (including Geldenhuys v CIR79 and Pyott Ltd v CIR80) relate to 
amounts received by the taxpayer on behalf of another or amounts received that may 
be refundable at a later stage. More recent cases such as MP Finance Group CC (in 
liquidation) v C:SARS81 also deal with amounts received that are refundable. Other 
cases, including CIR v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs,82 deal with the 
disposal of income after its receipt by the taxpayer. None of these circumstances apply 
in the Ochberg case, and it is submitted that it is irrelevant whether or not a taxpayer 
has benefited economically from a receipt or accrual, or whether an asset received in 
return for some performance on the part of the taxpayer later turns out to be of no 
value to the taxpayer. Taking into account only the receipt by Ochberg of the shares 
(and not the fact that he gave up an asset that he held in his personal capacity – the 
valuable lease and services) and the conclusions of De Villiers, C.J. and Roos, J.A., it 
is clear that he did benefit.
73 Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1987. Adam Smith. Macropaedia. Volume 27 at 308.
74 5 SATC 93 at 99.
75 20 SATC 113.
76 Supra at 123.
77 S 1 of the Income Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962, which is the same wording as in s 7(1) if the Income Tax Act, No 40 of 
1925.
78 Williams, R.C. 2005. Income Tax in South Africa. Cases and Materials. (2nd Ed.) Durban: LexisNexis at 102.
79 14 SATC 419.
80 13 SATC 121.
81 69 SATC 141.
82 23 SATC 380.
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The objective versus subjective debate
1The objective versus subjective debate is usually associated with the method of 
valuation of an asset received by a taxpayer in a form other than cash, and the 
Ochberg decision is often quoted in support of the objective approach.83
2Goldswain considers the judgment in the Ochberg case whereby the value of the 
shares was valued objectively rather than subjectively, taking into account that the 
taxpayer’s wealth had not increased at all, to be “patently unfair”.84 He supports the 
views of the judges who gave the dissenting minority judgments and suggests that 
their judgments are in accordance with the “purposive” approach to interpreting 
statues in terms of the Constitution of South Africa.
3The subjective approach is aptly illustrated in the decision in Stander v CIR85 and 
the objective approach in C:SARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd.86 In the former 
case, the taxpayer, Stander, was awarded an overseas trip as a prize by Delta Motor 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd for being adjudged one of the top five bookkeepers of the 
franchise dealers. The Commissioner assessed Stander in the amount of R14 000, being 
the value of the prize. It was held, inter alia, that the prize was not an “amount” as the 
taxpayer could not convert it into money. Thus, although the prize had an objective 
value, its subjective value to Stander was nil. In C:SARS v Brummeria Renaissance 
(Pty) Ltd, the Supreme Court of Appeal held (on the facts of the particular case) that 
the value of the right to retain and use borrowed funds interest free constituted an 
“amount” and that the value of this right, determined on an objective basis, must be 
included in the income of the respondent. The court rejected the principle applied in 
Stander v CIR that if something could not be converted into money, that it was not an 
“amount” for the purposes of “gross income”. The objective/subjective debate appears 
therefore to have been finally decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal, in favour of 
an objective approach to the valuation of an amount. However, it may be questioned 
whether the method of establishing the objective value was truly determined as 
the majority decision merely determined that the value of the shares issued was its 
nominal value.
The economic reality of the transaction
1In his judgment, Wessels, J.A. suggested87 that the purpose of tax is as follows: “The 
principle which underlies the Income Tax Act is that the State takes a percentage 
83 For example, Williams at 95.
84 Goldswain at 110.
85 59 SATC 212.
86 60 SATC 205.
87 5 SATC 93 at 112.
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of the moneys or money’s value which has accrued to the taxpayer during the year 
of assessment” and that “what the Act intends to tax is income”. Ochberg’s claim 
was that the shares given to him were not “income” as he already held almost all 
of the issued share capital and all that the new issue of shares meant was that he 
still held almost all of the shares. His argument appears to be based on the fact that 
the diminution in value of the shares he had formerly held was off-set by the value 
of the new shares; the economic reality of the transaction was that he had gained 
nothing as a result.
2It is submitted that the judges also considered the economic reality of the 
transaction. De Villiers, C.J. appeared to deny the need to consider the economic 
reality of the transaction when he stated88 that it was irrelevant whether and to what 
extent a person benefited and89 the repercussions of the receipt on the rest of his 
property did not matter. Roos, J.A. considered90 that the deductions provided for 
in the Income Tax Act do not affect the case. Stratford, J.A., however, was of the 
view91that the real nature of the issue of the shares must be looked at and its value to 
him – thus the economic reality of the issues of the shares.
3The reason why the decision in the Ochberg case did not fully reflect the economic 
reality of the transaction in the hands of the taxpayer was that the courts did not (and 
could not, as this was not contended by Ochberg) consider the fact that Ochberg had 
parted with a valuable asset (the right to the lease of the property). As the (full) value 
of the shares was included in his income, he was poorer to the extent of the value of 
the lease. Ochberg could not, however, argue that in reality whatever proportion of 
the shares relating to the services he provided to the company was anything other 
than income.
4The economic reality reasoning can be applied equally to the decision in C:SARS 
v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd as in that case the interest-free loans were granted 
to the taxpayer as a quid pro quo for the granting by the company of the right to 
rent-free occupation of units in the retirement villages. Again the court did not 
(and could not, as this argument was not raised by the defendant) consider that the 
economic reality of the transactions was that the company gained only to the extent 
that the value of the right to the interest-free loans exceeded the value of the rent-free 
occupation of the units owned by the company (if it indeed did).
88 Supra at 98.
89 Supra at 100.
90 Supra at 106.
91 Supra at 119.
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5One other aspect of the Ochberg decision that can be questioned is why the 
granting to Airton Timber Company of the lease to the property was considered to be 
“income”. It appears that what Ochberg granted was the right to lease the property, 
which it is submitted is a right of a capital nature (it formed part of the income earning 
structure of the company92 and provided an enduring benefit to the company93). Since 
the definition of “gross income” as it then stood excluded from its ambit amounts of a 
capital nature, he should not have been assessed to tax on the proportion of the shares 
relating to the value of the right. Although Ochberg contended that the shares were 
of a capital nature, different grounds were put forward for this claim. To that extent 
also, the decision of the court did not reflect the economic reality of the transaction. 
If, however, Ochberg had claimed the loss of the right to the lease of the property as a 
deduction in his personal tax return, economic reality would have been served.
The equity of the judgment
1As already discussed, the decision of the court in the Ochberg case resulted in 
Ochberg being placed in an inequitable economic position. Fairness or equity is a 
requirement of a good tax system, as postulated by Adam Smith in his Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776),94 and its continued relevance 
in modern times is echoed by Williams.95
2Wessels, J.A.96 expressed the view that if Ochberg’s interest in this company had 
been his only possession, he would have had to sell some shares to be able to pay his 
tax. This argument seems to imply that, as he was not enriched by the issue of shares 
(he already owned almost all of the shares in the company), his estate would have 
been impoverished by the tax payable. On this precept, Ochberg would appear to 
have been unfairly taxed.
3The Haig-Simons model of taxation is advanced in the literature as a tax that 
would be simple, fair and efficient. Weisbach97 states that the Haig-Simons definition 
of taxation is generally viewed as the ideal tax model. The Haig-Simons definition of 
taxation is based on the understanding that a taxpayer’s income in each tax period is 
equal to consumption plus the change in wealth for the period.98 Change in wealth 
92 New State Areas v CIR, 14 SATC 155.
93 British Insulated & Helsby Cables v Atherton, [1926] AC 205.
94 Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1987. Adam Smith. Macropaedia. Volume 27 at 308.
95 Williams, R.C. 2006. Income Tax in South Africa. Law and practice. Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths at 3.
96 5 SATC 93 at 113.
97 Weisbach, D.A. 1999-2000. A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System. Tax Law Review at 53.
98 Robert M. Haig, 1921 The Concept of Income–Economic and Legal Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax 1 (Robert M. 
Haig ed.), reprinted in Am. Ec. Ass’n, Readings in the Economics of Taxation 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup 
eds., 1959); Henry C. Simons, 1938. Personal Income Taxation at 50.
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is based on the change in value of a taxpayer’s assets plus any cash received, or is 
based on comprehensive income, which is the sum of a person’s annual consumption 
expenditures and the increment in that person’s net worth in a given year.
“Whether income is an accurate measure of taxpaying ability depends on how income is 
defined. The only definition that has been found to be completely consistent and free from 
anomalies and capricious results is ‘accrued income’, which is the money value of the goods 
and services consumed by the taxpayer plus or minus any change in net worth during a given 
period of time.”99
1At the time of the Ochberg case, increments in a person’s net worth in the form of 
capital receipts were not subject to tax – they were specifically excluded from the 
definition of “gross income” – and to that extent the South African tax system did 
not comply with the Haig-Simons ideal tax model. If, based on the South African 
tax system in force at the time, Ochberg had been taxed on what could be argued was 
a capital receipt, while this would be fair in terms of the Haig-Simons tax model, it 
would not have been fair in terms of the South African tax model.
Conclusion
1This article has analysed the judgment in Ochberg v CIR, where shares in the 
company were issued to the appellant in exchange for services to be rendered to the 
company and an asset transferred to the company. The dispute arose because the 
appellant, Ochberg, was taxed on the nominal value of the shares issued to him, 
while he was an almost 100% shareholder of the company both before and after the 
issue of the shares. He argued that he had, as a result, gained no benefit as his share 
of the assets of the company had remained the same. The case was decided in favour 
of the Commissioner by three of the judges, with two judges dissenting. The main 
principle the court had to decide on was whether the value of the shares issued to 
Ochberg constituted “income” and thus fell within the definition of “gross income”. 
Based on a number of differing grounds raised by De Villiers, C.J. and Roos, J.A. it 
was held that the shares did constitute income. The contrasting views presented by 
the five judges are an indication of the complex nature of the problem.
2The unique contribution made by this article lies in the thematic analysis of the 
four judgments and the discussion of pertinent issues arising from the case. The use 
of a thematic analysis process to compare and contrast the complex arguments of the 
four judges represents a departure from the usual mode of analysing court decisions. 
99 Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2013. The meaning of income.
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Six main themes and the contrasting views expressed by the judges were identified 
in the analysis of the judgments in the case:
• whether a benefit was received by Ochberg;
• the validity of the reliance placed by the appellant on the decision in Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue v Collins;
• the true substance of the transaction;
• the separate legal persona of the company and the effect of this on the taxability 
of the shares;
• the capital or revenue nature of the shares themselves; and
• indications that certain judges had applied either the strict literal approach to the 
interpretation of fiscal legislation or the purposive approach.
1The four contrasting judgments also presented an opportunity to discuss pertinent 
issues relating to general principles of taxation. These pertinent issues were:
• the requirement that a taxpayer should enjoy a benefit, in order to be taxed on an 
amount;
• the subjective versus objective debate in relation to the valuation of an “amount” 
for the purposes of the definition of “gross income”;
• the economic reality of the Ochberg transaction; and
• the equity of the decision in the Ochberg case in terms of Adam Smith’s precepts 
of an equitable tax system and the Haig-Simons theory of taxation.
1This article concluded that Ochberg did indeed obtain a partial benefit from the 
transaction, but only in relation to the services he rendered to the company. The 
granting of the right to a valuable lease could be interpreted as a receipt of a capital 
nature, which would not be included in “gross income” or in taxable income in 
terms of the legislation as it was then.
2The fact that the decision in the Ochberg case has made a lasting contribution to 
tax law is indicated by the number of times various aspects of the decision have been 
cited with approval in later court decisions, including CIR v Butcher Brothers (Pty) 
Ltd,100 Mooi v SIR,101 CIR v Visser,102 Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI103 and 
Hicklin v SIR,104 each of which was a landmark case in its own right.
100 13 SATC 21.
101 34 SATC 1.
102 8 SATC 271.
103 30 SATC 163.
104 1980 (1) SA 481 (A).
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